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The Financial Banking Institute
Act and the Financial CHOICE Act:
The Wrong Choice for the
American Economy
KIRBY MCMAHON*
INTRODUCTION
Following the financial crisis of 2007-2008, public trust in
financial institutions plummeted to historic lows1 and has yet
to fully recover.2 In the years leading up to the financial crisis
of 2007-2008 many financial institutions were allowed a
virtual field day, allowing for “poor monetary policy,
deregulation, bad regulation, innovation run amok, and
* J.D. Candidate (2019), University of Maryland Francis King Carey
School of Law. The author would like to thank the Executive Board and
editorial staff of the Journal of Business and Technology Law for their
hard work and support. The author would also like to thank his family
for their encouragement and support.
1 Frank Newport, Americans’ Confidence in Institutions Edges Up,
GALLUP NEWS (June 26, 2017), http://news.gallup.com/poll/212840/
americans-confidence-institutions-edges.aspx (finding that American
confidence in American “big businesses” hit a low of 16 percent in 2009
and American trust in banks declined ten percent from 2008 to 2009 from
32 to 22 percent—the lowest reported percentage in over 40 years).
2 Justin McCarthy, Americans’ Confidence in Banks Still Languishing
Below 30%, GALLUP NEWS (June 16, 2016), http://news.gallup.com/poll/
192719/americans-confidence-banks-languishing-below.aspx (noting that
“[t]he current percentage of adults who say they have confidence in banks
is just half of what it was in 2004”).
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greed” to gain a stranglehold on the American economy.3
While financial institutions cannot exclusively be blamed for
the crisis, they must be held accountable in order to prevent
subsequent financial crises.4
In response to the financial crisis, Congress enacted
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”).5 Dodd-Frank was created to
“improve systemic stability, improve policy options for coping
with failing financial firms, increase transparency
throughout financial markets, and protect consumers and
investors.”6 The Dodd-Frank Act implemented a number of
provisions designed to further transparency, accountability,
and stability in the American financial sector.7 One of these
reforms was the creation of the Orderly Liquidation
Authority, designed to quickly and efficiently liquidate
failing large financial firms.8 The Dodd-Frank Act also
established the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (the
“CFPB”) which allows for enhanced prudential regulation
and heightened standards of accountability and stability.9
Furthermore, the Act also created what is known as the
Volcker Rule, a ban on proprietary trading—trading that is
intended to benefit the bank, not the bank’s customers.10 In
addition to these reforms, Dodd-Frank ushered in a culture
Adam J. Levitin, The Crisis Without a Face: Emerging Narratives of the
Financial Crisis, 63 U. MIAMI. L. REV. 999, 1000 (2009).
4 Anton R. Valukas, White-Collar Crime and Economic Recession, 2010
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 21 (2010).
5 Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. ch. 53
(2012).
6 BAIRD WEBEL, CONG. RES. SERV., R41350, THE DODD-FRANK WALL
STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: ISSUES AND SUMMARY
3 (2010).
7 See id.
8 12 U.S.C.A, § 5384 (2015).
9 12 U.S.C. § 5491 (2012).
10 12 U.S.C.A. § 1851 (2018).
3
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change, eschewing the toxic and greed fueled culture in favor
of a more diverse and transparent culture.
In 2017, Congress made significant moves to abrogate
much of the Dodd-Frank Act.11 On April 5, 2017, the House
of Representatives passed the Financial Institution
Bankruptcy Act of 2017 (“FIBA”).12 FIBA would invalidate
many of the provisions of Dodd-Frank which govern the
liquidation of failing major financial institutions and would
create a new-subchapter in Chapter 11 for financial
institutions with financial assets of at least $50 billion.13
Additionally, on June 10, 2017 the House of Representatives
passed the Financial CHOICE Act of 2017 (“CHOICE Act”).14
The CHOICE Act repeals a number of provisions of the DoddFrank Act, including the Orderly Liquidation Authority,15
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,16 and the
Volcker Rule,17 among a number of other provisions.18
This comment argues that FIBA and the CHOICE Act
place too much power and freedom back in the hands of those
who bear substantial responsibility for the worst economic
Bruce Grohsgal, Do the Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act and the
CHOICE Act Undermine an Effective Restructuring of a Failing Financial
Institution?, HARV. L. SCH.: BANKR. ROUND TABLE (Jun. 13, 2017),
http://blogs.harvard.edu/bankruptcyroundtable/2017/06/13/financialinstitution-bankruptcy-act/ (noting that both the Financial Institution
Bankruptcy Act and the Financial CHOICE Act would repeal key
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act).
12 Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act of 2017, H.R. 1667, 115th Cong.
(2017).
13 Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act of 2017, H.R. 1667, 115th Cong.
§§ 2(a)(9A)(B), 2(b)(1) (2017).
14 H.R. 10, 115th Cong. (2017).
15 H.R. 10, 115th Cong. § 111 (2017).
16 Id. at § 711.
17 Id. at § 901.
18 See id.
11
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crisis since the Great Depression.19 The Dodd-Frank Act is by
no means a perfect solution to the problems stemming from
the Great Recession.20 However, the proposed bills purport to
strip away key provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act and replace
them with token gestures of regulation that allow financial
institutions many of the freedoms they enjoyed prior to the
financial crisis of 2007.21 Simply because the United States
economy has weathered the financial tumult of the crisis does
not mean that we can afford to relax financial regulations. 22
FIBA and the Financial CHOICE Act propose dangerous
relaxations of crucial financial regulations, which may allow
the United States to fall back into the mire of financial
corruption, misguided monetary policy, and unchecked
corporate greed.23 In the absence of meaningful alternative
financial regulations, Dodd-Frank must be upheld, perhaps
alongside FIBA, rather than only the FIBA and CHOICE
Acts.24

See Josh Bivens, Worst Economic Crisis Since the Great Depression? By
a Long Shot., ECON. POL’Y INST: ECON. SNAPSHOT (Jan. 27, 2010), http://
www.epi.org/publication/snapshot_20100127/; infra Part II.B.
20 Id.
21 See infra Part II.C.
22 Id.
23 See infra Parts II.B., II.C.
24 Mark J. Roe, Financial Scholars Oppose Eliminating “Orderly
Liquidation Authority” As Crisis-Avoidance Restructuring Backstop,
HARV. L. SCH., (May 26, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/05/
26/financial-scholars-oppose-eliminating-orderly-liquidation-authorityas-crisis-avoidance-restructuring-backstop/.
19
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I.

THE
DODD-FRANK
ACT:
ESTABLISHING
TRANSPARENCY IN THE MURKY WORLD OF WALL
STREET
A. The Need for Economic and Moral Reform

The driving force behind the Great Recession was the abrupt
drop of housing prices in 2007, following years of steep
increases.25 The housing crisis was exacerbated by reckless
lending practices and excessive risk taking, resulting in
major financial institutions sustaining massive losses.26
During the housing crisis, a number of the most prominent
financial institutions in the United States reported
staggering, and sometimes fatal, losses.27 The dire status of
the United States financial sector prompted a tax-payer
funded government bailout for many major institutions and
on September 28, 2009, Congress passed a $700 billion
bailout plan.28 However, even after the bailout plan passed,
confidence in the American financial market remained low
amongst both financial institutions themselves and the
American people.29 As a result, the era of “easy credit, overindulgence, and over-leveraging” gave way to an era of
unemployment, reduced consumer spending, and distrust in
the American financial market that had not been seen in
Eamonn K. Moran, Wall Street Meets Main Street: Understanding the
Financial Crisis, 13 N.C. BANK. INST. 5, 7 (2009).
26 Id.
27 Id. at 8-9 (noting that the financial crisis led to the extinction of
financial giants Bear Sterns and Lehman Brothers; financially crippled a
number of preeminent financial institutions such as Merrill Lynch,
Wachovia, A.I.G., Citigroup, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac; facilitated
the failure of large savings and loan companies Washington Mutual and
IndyMac Bank; and led to the extinction of the last two large independent
invest banks in existence: Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs).
28 Id. at 78.
29 Id. at 79; McCarthy, supra note 2.
25
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decades.30 In response, the American public demanded
accountability from Wall Street.31
B. Key Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act: The
Orderly Liquidation Authority
The Dodd-Frank Act establishes an organization known as
the Orderly Liquidation Authority (“the OLA”).32 The OLA is
an authority that is empowered to quickly handle the
liquidation of major financial institutions during times of
economic crisis.33 Rather than bankruptcy judges, the OLA is
comprised of financial regulators and financial experts.34 In
addition to the Orderly Liquidation Authority, Title II of the
Dodd-Frank Act also creates the Orderly Liquidation Fund.35
This fund authorizes the OLA to issue loans to financial
institutions that are deemed “systemically important.”36
Moran, supra note 25, at 99-100.
See Daniel Kaufman, Corruption and the Global Financial Crisis,
FORBES (Jan. 27, 2009), https://www.forbes.com/2009/01/27/corruptionfinancial-crisis-business-corruption09_0127corruption.html#38fd183061
b3 (contending that “[d]eep-seated transparency reforms need to be a
cornerstone” of financial reform and these reforms “should apply to U.S.
public agencies as well as domestic and international financial
institutions.”).
32 12 U.S.C.A. § 5384 (2015).
33 Paul L. Lee, The Dodd-Frank Act Orderly Liquidation Authority: A
Preliminary Analysis and Critique – Part II, 128 BANK. L.J. 867, 867
(2011).
34 Ben S. Bernanke, Why Dodd-Frank’s Orderly Liquidation Authority
Should Be Preserved, BROOKINGS INST. (Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.
brookings.edu/blog/ben-bernanke/2017/02/28/why-dodd-franks-orderlyliquidation-authority-should-be-preserved/.
35 12 U.S.C.A. § 5384 (2015).
36 Aaron Klein, A Primer on Dodd-Frank’s Orderly Liquidation Authority,
BROOKINGS INST. (Jun. 5, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/upfront/2017/06/05/a-primer-on-dodd-franks-orderly-liquidation-authority/
(explaining that “Dodd-Frank extended the FDIC’s authority to resolve
failed institutions beyond commercial banks to include the entire bank
30
31
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These loans have come under heavy criticism for serving as
nothing more than a façade for more taxpayer bailouts.37
However, the loans are not taxpayer bailouts because the
Dodd-Frank Act mandates that these loans are backed by the
assets of the financial institutions. Moreover, these loans are
recovered during the resolution process, and if recovery is not
feasible, loans will otherwise be obtained from other major
financial institutions.38
C. Key Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act:
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act establishes the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (“the CFPB”).39 The CFPB was
designed with the intent of curbing many of the regulatory
deficiencies leading up to and culminating in the financial
crisis of 2007-2008.40 The CFPB was designed to consolidate
a wide array of financial regulations, prevent consumer
protection from being “subordinated to regulatory concerns
about bank profitability,” and ensure that financial
regulators wield the necessary and requisite financial
expertise to ensure implementation of effective regulations.41
Congress empowered the CFPB with general
rulemaking, supervision, and enforcement authority over a
wide array of institutions that fall within the ambit of the
consumer financial services industry.42 The CFPB has broad
authority to hold large financial institutions to stricter rules
holding company and all firms designated as Systemically Important
Financial Institutions (SIFIs).”).
37 Roe, supra note 24.
38 Id.
39 12 U.S.C. § 5491 (2012).
40 Webel, supra note 6, at 10.
41 Adam J. Levitin, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: An
Introduction, 32 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 321, 331, 343 (2013).
42 Id. at 322.
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and regulations concerning transparency and stability.43
Such broad authority over the financial markets has
garnered substantial criticism by many who fear that with
such vast authority, regulators will again rescue failing
financial institutions with taxpayer dollars.44
D. Key Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act: The
Volcker Rule
Another key provision of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Volcker
Rule, implements a ban commercial banks engaging in
proprietary trading.45 Proprietary trading is high-risk
trading, wherein bank employees will engage in highly
speculative trading in order to make a profit for the bank
rather than the bank’s customers.46 In the early 2000s
proprietary trading was commonplace, as banks and their
affiliates ran rampant with morally and financially dubious
investments and trade deals in search of higher profits,
salaries, and bonuses.47 Furthermore, proprietary trading
Webel, supra note 6, at 11-12.
Steven A. Ramirez, Dodd-Frank as Maginot Line, 15 CHAP. L. REV. 109,
123 (2011) (explaining that many financial experts believe that “too many
avenues remain open for regulators to rescue creditors of large banks,
and that those regulators now have a proven track record of indulging
powerful bank interests”).
45 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (2012).
46 Stacy Goto Grant, Note, International Financial Regulation Through
the G20: The Proprietary Trading Case Study, 45 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1217,
1221 (2014).
47 Jeff Merkley & Carl Levin, The Dodd-Frank Act Restrictions on
Proprietary Trading and Conflicts of Interest: New Tools to Address
Evolving Threats, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 515, 522 (2011) (labeling
proprietary trading methods of major financial institutions prior to the
financial crisis of 2007-2008 as “increasingly complex and risky”); Onnig
H. Dombalagian, Proprietary Trading: Of Scourges, Scapegoats, and
Scofflaws Twenty-Fifth Annual Corporate Law Symposium:
43
44
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presents substantial conflict of interest issues between large
banks and their customers.48 By engaging in highly
speculative and risky trading on the customers’ behalf, banks
create the potential for generating profits at the expense of
their own clients.49 The Volcker Rule sought to put an end to
the risks and moral quandaries that accompany proprietary
trading.50
II.

FIBA AND THE FINANCIAL CHOICE ACT:
PUTTING TRUST INTO THE HANDS OF THE
UNTRUSTWORTHY

With the FIBA and the CHOICE Act Congress has made a
clear push to put power back in the hands of the major
financial institutions.51 Both FIBA and the CHOICE Act will
impose substantial changes to the manner in which major
financial institutions are processed in times of economic
crisis.52 Furthermore, the CHOICE Act would mandate
major changes to the CFPB and its authority to regulate
major financial firms.53 Additionally, the CHOICE Act
includes a repeal of the Volcker Rule, which will allow
commercial banks to engage in high risk, speculative trading
conducted solely for the profit of the bank.54
Implementing Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 387, 388 (2012).
48 Onnig H. Dombalagian, Proprietary Trading: Of Scourges, Scapegoats,
and Scofflaws Twenty-Fifth Annual Corporate Law Symposium:
Implementing Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 387, 388 (2012).
49 Id.
50 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (2012).
51 See infra Part III.
52 See supra notes 13-15.
53 See supra note 16.
54 See supra note 17.
Journal of Business & Technology Law

115

Financial Banking Institute Act and Financial CHOICE Act

A. Repeal of the Orderly Liquidation Authority
If enacted into law, FIBA would essentially dissolve the OLA
and allow failing financial firms to restructure in bankruptcy
court.55 However, dissolving the OLA may actually hurt the
efficacy of many of FIBA’s key provisions.56 The stated
purpose of the OLA is to quickly and efficiently liquidate
failing financial firms in times of financial crisis.57 Simply
put, bankruptcy courts are not as well situated to quickly and
efficiently handle the liquidation of failing financial firms as
the OLA is.58 The OLA and its members wield a number of
skills and benefits that only they are equipped to provide,
including: knowledge and expertise of American and
international financial markets; the ability to plan and
monitor for the possibility of a financial meltdown;
coordination; and liquidity.59
First and foremost, the OLA is comprised of financial
regulators, many of whom have spent their entire career
working in the financial industry.60 Not only do these
regulators
possess
an
extensive
knowledge
and
understanding of the American and global financial markets,
but they also possess the requisite contacts to coordinate
large scale liquidation of financial institutions with offices
Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act of 2017, H.R. 1667, 115th Cong.
(2017).
56 Letter from Jeffrey Gordon, et al., Professor, Columbia Law School, to
members of Congress (May 23, 2017) (on file with author) (explaining that
“[f]or FIBA to function properly, it needs institutional supports that only
the OLA and its related rules now provide, making FIBA inadequate as
the sole resolution mechanism available in a crisis.”).
57 12 U.S.C.A. § 5384 (2015).
58 Bernanke, supra note 34 (declaring that “[i]t is simply not plausible
that judges would be as effective as financial regulators in preparing for
a speedy resolution or in managing one during a period of high financial
stress.”).
59 See Gordon, supra note 56; Bernanke, supra note 34.
60 Bernanke, supra note 34.
55
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across the world.61 Under the current provisions of the OLA,
regulators are authorized to initiate the liquidation
proceedings.62 However, this authority would be abolished
under FIBA, wherein proceedings may only begin once a
financial institution has filed for bankruptcy.63 Being able to
initiate liquidation proceedings is critical, as it allows
regulators to communicate with and acclimatize foreign
regulators to the bankruptcy process.64 Otherwise foreign
regulators are liable to seize the assets of the financial
institution within their jurisdiction, which is often the “death
knell” for successful bankruptcies.65
Furthermore, the Dodd-Frank Act requires
systemically important financial institutions to maintain
living wills that provide a plan for their resolution in the
event of a financial crisis.66 These living wills allow the OLA
to plan for any potential financial crisis and monitor the
market and the individual financial firms for signs of
impending financial stress, and plan appropriate remedial
measures.67
Lastly, the OLA is authorized to provide liquidity to
financial firms when it is deemed necessary.68 Liquidity is
often vital to stabilizing financial firms.69 However, liquidity
may only be provided through an FDIC receivership, which
includes the OLA—bankruptcy judges cannot provide
Gordon, supra note 56 (asserting that “[a] U.S. bankruptcy court will
lack deep prior relationships or the authority to reach understandings
with foreign regulators in advance of a bankruptcy filing.”).
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 165(d),
12 U.S.C. § 5325 (2012).
67 Gordon, supra note 56; Bernanke, supra note 34.
68 12 U.S.C.A. § 5384 (2015).
69 Gordon, supra note 56.
61
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liquidity.70 Moreover, in addition to the liquidity support
itself, public knowledge of the liquidity is often immensely
important in stabilizing financial markets and ensuring the
American public retains confidence in the American financial
industry.71
In short, the OLA provides a number of key benefits
that are unique in this day in age.72 The FIBA and the
Financial CHOICE Act abolish the OLA and replace it with
a court system that is ill-equipped to handle the dissolution
of financial firms in times of economic crisis.73 The vigor of
the system proposed by these acts would be severely
diminished by the repeal of the OLA.74 If this proposed
system is to be enacted, it must be enacted alongside the
OLA, not in place of the OLA.75
B. Reprieve
from
Regulations

Enhanced

Prudential

The Financial CHOICE Act proposes to replace the CFPB
with the Consumer Law Enforcement Agency (the “CLEA”).76
The CLEA would inherit many of the same rulemaking
authorities of the CFPB, however, it would not retain the
authority to conduct examinations or supervise any of the
activities of major financial firms.77 Furthermore, the CLEA
would be required to conduct a cost-benefit analysis of every
Id.
Id.
72 See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
73 Randall D. Guynn, Are Bailouts Inevitable, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 137
(2012) (explaining that the stresses of a global financial panic expose the
weaknesses of the Bankruptcy Code when it is the only available option).
74 Gordon, supra note 56.
75 Id.
76 MARC LABONTE, ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE FINANCIAL
CHOICE ACT IN 115TH CONGRESS: SELECTED POLICY ISSUES 29 (2017).
77 Id.
70
71
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proposed enforcement action prior to implementing or
engaging in such actions.78 And unlike the CFPB, the CLEA
would not have the authority to “prohibit unfair, deceptive,
and abusive acts or practices in consumer financial
markets.”79
In addition to the loosening of regulatory restrictions
precipitated by the proposed changes to the CFPB, the
Financial CHOICE Act also provides a “regulatory off-ramp”
for major financial institutions.80 This “regulatory off-ramp”
essentially allows for financial institutions that are covered
by the current regulatory standards to opt out of enhanced
regulations81 in exchange for subjecting the institution to a
higher, ten percent leverage ratio.82
These proposed changes represent an abrupt shift in
economic regulation; scaling back many of the more robust
features of the Dodd-Frank Act.83 Such a drastic reduction in
economic regulation is troubling because it represents a
Id.
Id.
80 Lee A. Meyerson & Spencer A. Sloan, Treasury Department Issues
Recommendations on Reforming the U.S. Financial System, HARV. L.
SCH., (Jun. 23, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/06/23/
treasury-department-issues-recommendations-on-reforming-the-u-sfinancial-system/.
81 These regulations include, but are not limited to: risk-based and
leverage capital requirements, liquidity standards, requirements for
overall risk management (including establishing a risk committee),
stress-test requirements, and a 150-to-1 debt-to-equity limit for
companies that the Financial Stability Oversight Committee has
determined pose a grave threat to financial stability. 12 C.F.R. § 252.3235 (2018).
82 Labonte, supra note 76, at 6.
83 Paul Lee, The CHOICE Act Is a Bad Choice for Financial Reform, THE
CLS BLUE SKY BLOG: COLUM. L. SCH., (Sep. 26, 2017) (observing that
“[t]here are few precedents in modern political history for such a rapid
and fundamental reversal of course,” and that the Financial CHOICE Act
would “repeal or severely circumscribe most of the Dodd-Frank Act
provisions aimed at systemic risk.”).
78
79
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“social amnesia.”84 In scaling back regulations, Congress
again opens the door for financial institutions to engage in
morally and financially suspect deals that may drag the
American economy into another financial crisis.85 Indeed,
many of the regulations proposed by the Financial CHOICE
Act are not economically viable.86 For example, currently
none of the largest American banks are capable of meeting
the ten-percent leverage ratio required for the “regulatory
off-ramp.”87 Moreover, many experts question the wisdom of
using a sole measure, such as the ten percent leverage ratio
in this case, to measure the financial health of an
institution.88 The “regulatory off-ramp” stands as an example
of the broader objective of the aims of the Financial Choice
Act: deregulation.89
The Financial CHOICE Act replaces the CFPB with an
agency that has far less authority to stamp out financially
and morally dubious banking practices.90 Additionally, the
CHOICE Act purports to allow for financial institutions to
escape the enhanced standards Dodd-Frank established in
exchange for meeting a standard that none of the major
banks are capable of meeting.91 In short, the Financial
CHOICE Act repeals a vast majority of the regulations
designed to prevent another financial crisis all in the name
John C. Coffee Jr., Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial
Reform Tends to be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated
Symposium: Financial Regulatory Reform in the Wake of the Dodd-Frank
Act, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 1078 (2012).
85 Id. at 1079.
86 Lee, supra note 83.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 163 CONG. REC. H4717 (daily ed. June 8, 2017) (statement of Rep.
Waters) (labeling the Financial CHOICE Act a “vehicle for Donald
Trump’s agenda to deregulate and help out Wall Street.”).
90 Labonte, supra note 76, at 29.
91 Lee, supra note 83.
84
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of increasing short term financial growth.92 The CHOICE Act
represents a myopic aim of short-term financial growth at the
potential cost of another financial crisis in the mold of the
Great Recession.93
C. Decrease in Financial Stress-Testing
One of the cornerstones of the proposed CHOICE Act, the
“regulatory off-ramp,” allows major financial institutions to
regain many of the liberties they enjoyed prior to the
financial crisis of 2007.94 This “regulatory off-ramp” would
allow for a drastic reduction in financial stress testing
requirements
in
systemically
important
financial
95
institutions. Stress testing requires financial institutions to
maintain capital that is not tied up in bad loans or risky
investments.96 These financial stress tests seek to ensure
that financial systems are capable of surviving another
financial disaster precipitated by a wide array of factors. 97
The Federal Reserve currently runs financial systems
through a litany of hypothetical scenarios to help mold
financial regulations and assess the capabilities of American
financial institutions to weather the storm of another
financial disaster.98 For example, in 2016 the Federal
Reserve implemented a stress test in which banks were
forced to assess their ability to cope with negative U.S. shortterm Treasury rates, in addition to major losses to their
Id.
Coffee, supra note 84.
94 H. Rodgin Cohen & Samuel R. Woodall III, Financial CHOICE Act of
2017, HARV. L. SCH.: F. CORP. GOV’T FIN. REG. (Jun. 15, 2017),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/06/15/financial-choice-act-of-2017/.
95 Id.
96 Margaret Ryznar et al, Implementing Dodd-Frank Act Stress Testing,
14 DEPAUL BUS. & CO. 323, 324 (2016).
97 Id. at 325.
98 Id.
92
93
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corporate and commercial real estate lending portfolios.99
Thus, stress testing is “an important macroprudential
regulatory tool,” as it enables financial regulators to attain a
“deeper and broader view of the future health” of financial
institutions under a myriad of scenarios.100
The Financial CHOICE Act of 2017 seeks to
implement a number of modifications to current stress
testing standards that would profoundly inhibit the efficacy
of the testing.101 First and foremost, the Comprehensive
Capital Analysis and Review (“CCAR”) process would be
conducted every two years, rather than every year.102 The
CCAR process is the method by which financial regulators
determine whether a financial institution has an adequate
amount of capital to survive another financial disaster.103 In
addition to limiting application of the CCAR process to every
two years, the Financial CHOICE Act would also eliminate
all mid-year stress test processes.104 Furthermore, the
Federal Reserve would be required to disclose the economic
conditions used for stress testing, as well as solicit public
comment on these conditions.105 The Financial CHOICE Act
of 2017 would also prohibit the Federal Reserve from using
the CCAR qualitative assessment to prohibit a bank from
making a planned distribution.106 Under the current system
a dedicated supervisory team, run by the Federal Reserve,
Id.
Behzad Gohari & Karen E. Woody, The New Global Financial
Regulatory Order: Can Macroprudential Regulation Prevent Another
Global Financial Disaster? 40 J. CORP. L. 403, 432 (2015).
101 Cohen & Woodhall, supra note 94.
102 Id.
103 Stress Tests and Capital Planning, FED. RES. (Mar. 7, 2017), https://
www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/stress-tests-capital-planning
.htm.
104 Cohen & Woodhall, supra note 94.
105 Id.
106 Id.
99

100
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has the authority to object to a financial institution’s capital
plan, based on the firm’s qualitative assessment. 107
Therefore, under the rules proposed by the CHOICE Act of
2017, even if a qualitative assessment reveals that a financial
institution has a substantial lack of capital to survive a
financial disaster, the Federal Reserve is powerless to
prevent the institution from engaging in bad loans and risky
investments.108
The essence of stress testing is ensuring that financial
systems are healthy and capable of surviving another
financial disaster.109 The CHOICE Act of 2017 seeks to
implement significant reductions in the vitality of stress
testing.110 However, the American financial sector is illprepared for such a drastic reduction in stress testing.111
Citigroup has failed Dodd-Frank stress tests twice, and
Goldman Sachs and Bank of America would have failed if
they had not amended their capital distribution.112 A critical
factor in the facilitation of the financial crisis of 2007-2008
was a profound lack of financial stress testing—banks were
simply unaware of how their institution would cope with the
advent of financial crisis.113 Moreover, the implementation of
stress testing throughout the financial sector has found
“great success both for the health of the institutions and the
Qualitative Assessment Framework, Process, and Summary of Results,
FED. RES. (Aug. 23, 2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/
2017-june-ccar-assessment-framework-results-qualitative-assessment
.htm (explaining that dedicated supervisory teams have the authority to
“formulate a recommendation” to the Federal Reserve “to object or not to
object to a firm’s capital plan based on” the qualitative assessment).
108 Cohen & Woodhall, supra note 94.
109 Ryznar et al., supra note 96.
110 See Cohen & Woodhall, supra note 94, at 325.
111 Ryznar et al., supra note 96, at 346.
112 Id. at 325=26.
113 Eugene A. Ludwig, Assessment of Dodd-Frank Financial Regulatory
Reform: Strengths, Challenges, and Opportunities for a Stronger
Regulatory Reform, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 181, 186 (2012).
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marketplace.”114 Therefore, financial stress testing should
not be scaled down merely because financial institutions
have survived the financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the
ensuing financial turmoil.115
Conversely, some commentators argue that the
current stress testing protocols do not go far enough to ensure
that financial institutions are capable of surviving yet
another financial meltdown.116 Robert Weber contends that
current stress testing procedures are more akin to “audit-like
exercises that validate existing business practices and
mathematical models,” than earnest attempts to discern the
financial vitality of systemically important financial
institutions.117 For financial regulations to work to their full
potential, stress testing of financial regulations must truly be
“conceptualized as multi-actor deliberations on how a firm
might fail.”118 Thus, while the stress testing regulations
implemented by Dodd-Frank are a step in the right direction,
they must evolve into more comprehensive and vigorous
evaluations in order to truly ensure the health of financial
institutions.119 Ultimately, if current financial stress testing
does not go far enough to ensure the health of major financial
institutions, the regulations should be enhanced, not
repealed.120
Id.
Daniel K. Tarullo, The Departing Remarks of Federal Reserve Governor
Daniel K. Tarullo, HARV. L. SCH.: F. CORP. GOV’T FIN. REG. (May 1, 2017),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/05/01/the-departing-remarks-offederal-reserve-governor-daniel-k-tarullo/ (warning that “it is crucial that
the strong capital regime [of current stress testing procedures] be
maintained”).
116 Robert F. Weber, The Corporate Finance Case for DeliberationOriented Stress Testing Regulation, 39 J. CORP. L. 833, 834 (2014).
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 857.
120 Id.
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D. Repeal of the Volcker Rule
Title IX of the Financial CHOICE ACT provides for the
repeal of the Volcker Rule.121 As previously mentioned, the
Volcker Rule acts as a ban on proprietary trading – or what
amounts to highly speculative and risky trading that only the
bank stands to profit from.122 The Volcker Rule was enacted
in order to prevent highly speculative trading, as well as the
conflicts of interests that arise out of this trading, where
banks may be incentivized to mislead or deceive their own
customers regarding the buying of securities.123
Deregulation allowed commercial banks to compete
with investment banks and securities firms through high
risk and complex proprietary trading.124 Commercial banks
became increasingly reliant on proprietary trading as a form
of revenue.125 However, proprietary trading left banks
financially vulnerable; in the fourth financial quarter of 2007
losses from proprietary trading amounted to almost 250
percent of net operating revenue.126 In addition to the risky
and speculative nature of the deals, proprietary trading
carries an innate propensity to create conflicts of interest
among large financial institutions.127 Proprietary trading
creates situations where financial institutions stand to profit
by either marketing products to their own clients that are
designed to fail or using client trading information against
H.R. 10, 115th Cong. § 901 (2017).
Grant, supra note 46.
123 Andrew F. Tuch, Conflicted Gatekeepers: The Volcker Rule and
Goldman Sachs, 7 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 365, 373 (2012).
124 Grant, supra note 46, at 1226-27.
125 Merkley & Levin, supra note 47.
126 Id.
127 Id. (explaining that proprietary trading provides an “increasingly
irresistible” temptation for large financial firms, thereby often leading to
conflicts of interest between the bank and its clients).
121
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the interests of that same client by leveraging the client
information to secure better trading deals for the bank
itself.128 Repeal of the Volcker Rule would allow banks to once
more engage in trade deals that crippled domestic and
international financial markets129 and turned them against
their own clients.130 The best way to ensure that financial
institutions do not repeat past behavior of treacherous trade
deals and rampant conflicts of interest is through a robust
regulation system.131 Nevertheless, the Financial CHOICE
Act seeks to repeal the very rule that prohibits a substantial
amount of the activity that contributed to the financial crisis
and once more allows large financial institutions the freedom
to leverage the money of their own client for speculative gains
of megabanks.132
E. Culture Change: Diversifying and Regulating
As previously discussed, the financial crisis of 2007-2008 was
ushered in by an era of deregulation that gave way to reckless
and irresponsible financial decisions.133 However, these poor
financial decisions were, in turn, precipitated by a culture
within many large firms that encouraged and glorified profits
Id. at 522-526.
Id. at 515 (stating that proprietary trading “played a critical role” in
creating the financial crisis of 2007-2008).
130 Id. at 522.
131 Merkley & Levin, supra note 47, at 553 (declaring that the financial
crisis of 2007-2008 was created by “poor policy choice and lax regulation”
allowing for proprietary trading to continue unabated”).
132 Id.
133 Kristin Johnson et al., Diversifying to Mitigate Risk: Can Dodd-Frank
Section 342 Help Stabilize the Financial Sector, 73 WASH. & LEE. L. REV.
1795, 1797 (2016) (explaining that many large financial firms “engineered
and invested in high risk financial instruments that ultimately generated
large losses” which in turn “triggered a run on the shadow banking sector
and later crippled the conventional banking sector and spelled calamity
for the global economy.”).
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at any cost, and ultimately facilitated financial disaster.134
Dodd-Frank was intended to change both the culture
surrounding regulation of financial firms, as well as the
culture within financial firms.135
1. Promoting Diversity and Stability
Prior to the financial crisis, many firms were blighted by
“[u]nprecedented compensation and brazen behavior,” which
gave way to an “environment devoid of accountability.”136 The
American financial sector was dominated by a culture of
“egotism and bravado” that only exacerbated poor financial
decisions and a disregard for financial accountability and
stability.137 Wall street was dominated by the “cowboy
culture” of major financial institutions, where the corporate
culture “feeds on itself, and people rise up the ranks, who are
its exemplars and cheerleaders and who are risk takers,
too.”138 Corporate culture was warped into a culture that
glorified financial gain above all else and fostered a culture
of excessive risk taking and glorification of money, thereby
creating a culture that would lead to financial disaster.139
In response to this toxic culture, Dodd-Frank
instituted a number of reforms to increase diversity and
See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY REP. xix
2011 (finding that the financial crisis was facilitated by “stunning
instances of governance breakdowns and irresponsibility” within major
financial institutions).
135 See generally Johnson et al., supra note 133.
136 Johnson et al., supra note 133, at 1799.
137 Id. at 1801.
138 Id. at 1802; Donald C. Langevoort, Chasing the Greased Pig Down Wall
Street: A Gatekeeper’s Guide to the Psychology, Culture, and Ethics of
Financial Risk Taking, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1209, 1239 (2011).
139 See generally Langevoort, Chasing the Greased Pig Down Wall Street:
A Gatekeeper’s Guide to the Psychology, Culture, and Ethics of Financial
Risk Taking, 96 CORNELL L. REV. (2011).
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inclusions within corporate structures.140 Prior to the
passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, only two of the twenty-five
largest banks in the county were headed by a minority, and
none were headed by a woman.141 Section 342 provided for a
number of reforms seeking to foster a new culture of financial
responsibility
and
accountability
within
financial
142
institutions. For example, Section 342 requires all federal
agencies to establish an Office of Minority and Women
Inclusion.143 The Office of Minority and Women Inclusion is
responsible for ensuring that diversity is leveraged
throughout the agencies and in all matters governed by each
respective agency.144
Reforms promoting diversity within corporate
structure may prove to have profound effects on the stability
of the financial sector.145 For example, one study found
women to be more risk averse than men.146 Furthermore,
African-American and Hispanic households “also display
more risk aversion than white households in their
investment choices,” in the post financial crisis era.147
Additionally, there is substantial data to suggest that market
bubbles are fueled by the “ethnic homogeneity of traders,”
which “imbues people with false confidence in the judgment
of coethnics, discouraging them from scrutinizing
12 U.S.C. § 5452 (2012).
Johnson et al., supra note 133, at 1843.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id. (providing that the Office of Minority and Women Inclusion “shall
be responsible for all matters of the agency relating to diversity in
management, employment, and business activities”).
145 See generally Johnson et al., supra note 133.
146 Rachel Croson & Uri Gneezy, Gender Differences in Preferences, 47 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 1, 7 (2009).
147 Johnson et al., supra note 133, at 1812.
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behavior.”148 Studies have further suggested that firms with
a high degree of diversity amongst governing boards “achieve
higher corporate social responsibility ratings.”149
2. Regulating a Deregulated Industry
Generally, in the years leading up to the financial crisis, the
financial sector was regulated by way of deregulation; the
market was seen as a self-regulating entity.150 This period of
deregulation gave financial institutions a wide berth to
engage in behavior that resulted in short-term gains, but
later resulted in financial catastrophe.151
Dodd-Frank is a direct response to the years of
deregulation and systemic deficiencies in stability and
accountability.152 Dodd-Frank implements a number of
measures that are directly tailored to combat the excessive
risk taking and lack of accountability that directly facilitated
the Great Recession.153 Dodd-Frank—and the broader
scheme of regulation that it represents, macroprudential
regulation—is actively seen as “the most credible policy and
regulatory mechanism for the prevention of systemic shocks,
Id. at 1814 (citing Sheen S. Levine et al., Ethnic Diversity Deflates
Bubble Prices, 111 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 18524, 18524 (2014)).
149 Id. at 1816.
150 The Causes and Current State of the Financial Crisis Before the
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, FDIC.GOV (Jan. 14, 2010)
(statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation) (explaining that for the past two decades there was “a world
view that markets were, by their very nature, self-regulating and selfcorrecting”), https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/chairman/spjan14
10.html.
151 Id. (explaining that market discipline allowed for “the excesses of the
past few years,” and that “the regulatory system also failed in its
responsibilities”).
152 Id.
153 See supra Part I.
148
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and the management of any systemic risk in the financial
services industry.”154
As such, Dodd-Frank’s reforms are critical pieces of
legislation that seek to remedy the systemic issues
culminating in the Great Recession.155 Yet the reforms are
also highly important for what they represent: a repudiation
of the practices that crippled the American economy.156 DoddFrank represents an acknowledgement of the importance of
financial accountability and stability, as well as the critical
role that diversity plays in upholding those ideals.157 The
Financial CHOICE Act not only repeals many key
regulations that promote financial stability and
accountability, but it repeals the culture change and
reinstitutes the culture that glorified risky investments, a
lack of accountability, and unbridled egotism and
homogeneity.158
3. De-politicizing Regulation: Letting Regulators
Regulate
One of the central concepts at issue in the debate between
Dodd-Frank and the CHOICE Act and FIBA is the extent of
regulation.159 Simply put, there is a burgeoning ideological
Gohari & Woody, supra note 100, at 437.
See supra Part I.
156 See generally, Johnson ET AL., supra note 133.
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Geoff Bennet, House Passes Bill Aimed at Reversing Dodd-Frank
Financial Regulations, NPR (June 8, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/
06/08/532036374/house-passes-bill-aimed-at-reversing-dodd-frankfinancial-regulations (quoting co-author of the CHOICE Act, Rep. Jeb
Hensarling, as stating that “Dodd-Frank represents the greatest
regulatory burden on our economy”); supra note 89 (quoting Rep. Maxine
Waters as labeling the CHOICE Act “a vehicle for Donald Trump’s
agenda to deregulate and help out Wall Street.”).
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rift as to how much regulation should be implemented and
who should oversee the implementation.160 The CHOICE
ACT and FIBA intend to strip away many key financial
regulations of Dodd-Frank and allow much greater freedom
to major financial institutions.161 Charles Murdock explains
that a major issue with the proposed changes of the Financial
CHOICE Act and FIBA “is that our financial regulators
frequently come from the financial industry, and often go
back to it.”162
One of the cornerstones of the CHOICE Act is taking
regulatory powers away from regulatory agencies and giving
major financial institutions broader authority to regulate
themselves.163 Financial regulation over the past several
decades has been defined by a “deregulatory mindset,” as
well as “timidity and deference to the banking regulators.”164
The financial crisis of the 2000s has proven that regulations
cannot be implemented only when the financial sector is on
the brink of crisis.165 Rather, regulation must be robust and
proactive.166 Regulation is most effective when it is used as a
platform to prevent systemically important financial
See H.R. REP. No. 115-153, pt. 1, at 2 (2017) (“Demanding
Accountability from Financial Regulators and Devolving Power Away
From Wall Street”); Ben Bernanke, Ending “Too Big To Fail”: What’s the
Right Approach?, BROOKINGS INST., (May 13, 2016), https://www.
brookings.edu/blog/ben-bernanke/2016/05/13/ending-too-big-to-failwhats-the-right-approach/ (touting the success of and need for additional
financial regulations in the wake of the financial crisis of 2007-2008).
161 Gordon, supra note 56.
162 Charles W. Murdock, The Big Banks: Background, Deregulation,
Financial Innovation, and Too Big to Fail, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 505, 553
(2012).
163 See generally, supra Parts II.B, II.C, II.D.
164 Murdock, supra note 162, at 555.
165 David. A. Moss, An Ounce of Prevention, HARV. MAG. (Sept.-Oct. 2009),
available at https://harvardmagazine.com/2009/09/financial-risk-mana
gement-plan.
166 Id. at 28.
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institutions from crippling the entire financial sector and
spreading loss throughout the broader economy.167
Moreover, following the financial crisis of the 2000s,
politicians in the United States and around the world
assumed many of the responsibilities previously held by
independent non-partisan financial regulators.168 However,
politicians are compelled to “make bailout decisions in the
headwinds of electoral strategizing, ideological polarization,
and interest group pressures.”169 Not only are independent
regulators free from the political considerations that
influence politicians, but independent financial regulators
almost invariably possess the technical expertise required to
effectively regulate the financial sector.170 It is imperative
that regulation of the American financial sector is left in the
hands of independent regulators, and that regulations or
deregulations are not implemented as a means of satisfying
a political base.
CONCLUSION
The Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act and the Financial
CHOICE Act restore far too much freedom to the hands of
persons and institutions that have proven they cannot be
trusted to act without regulations and safeguards.171 It is
well established that the financial crisis of 2007-2008 was
ushered in by an era of unchecked and unbridled greed,
speculation, and excessive risk taking.172 The Dodd-Frank
Act is by no means a perfect solution to the systemic issues
Id. at 27.
Stavros Gadinis, From Independence to Politics in Financial
Regulation, 101 CAL. L. REV. 327, 388 (2013).
169 Id. at 389.
170 Id.
171 See supra Part II.C.
172 Id.
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that gave way to a financial meltdown. However, the DoddFrank Act must not be repealed without a meaningful
replacement, as the Act helps to prevent the systemic risk
that facilitated the financial crisis of 2007-2008.173 FIBA and
the CHOICE Act repeal a substantial portion of the DoddFrank Act without enacting meaningful reform to replace
it.174 By returning to an era of deregulation less than a
decade after one of the greatest financial crises in this
country’s history, Congress has opened the door for financial
institutions to once more betray the interests of their own
clients and pursue risky and potentially ruinous investments
and trade deals.175 FIBA and the CHOICE Act represent a
dangerous shift in financial legislation, once more opening
the door for yet another financial disaster, all in the name of
deregulation.176
See Coffee, supra note 84.
Lee, supra note 83 (stating that “the CHOICE Act does not attempt to
frame its own approach” to systemic approach in the financial industry,
but rather the CHOICE Act “abandons the field”).
175 Merkley & Levin, supra note 47, at 553.
176 Id.
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